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someone

Sat, 18 Aug 2018 08:30:53 +0200

house raids and searches are happening here somewhat frequently. There could be content that needs to stay private.

Does the encyption tool provide this security, or would the police gain control over the content as soon as they have physical control over the server (asuming just hubzilla is being hosted and no additional server encryption.)

!Hubzilla Support Forum !Disroot Community

infosec encryption

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Raymond Monret

Sat, 18 Aug 2018 08:39:39 +0200

All the keys needed to decrypt the contents of the database are stored inside the database itself, except the messages (be they posts or private messages) that have been end-to-end encrypted by entering a key in the browser (button with a key if enabeld by site admin). You can secure such a key using a tool like keypass.

Brumaire

Sat, 18 Aug 2018 09:13:23 +0200

For more security you can use a tool like eCryptFS or dm-crypt to encrypt the directory/partion where Hubzilla and other services files & database are stored at and then put the key on a removable device that you can easily hide of physically destroy.

Brumaire

Sat, 18 Aug 2018 09:14:09 +0200

See here : https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Dm-crypt

Einer von Vielen

Sat, 18 Aug 2018 23:40:17 +0200

You could mount Hubzillas cloud storage using WebDAV. This works fine. Then use cryFS for example locally. This should be save for your files.

For post an comments I would suggest "even more encryption". It uses a JS to end-to-end encrypt Form browser to browser.

Take "a" as password for my next comment......wait...

Einer von Vielen

Sat, 18 Aug 2018 23:40:49 +0200

Einer von Vielen

Sat, 18 Aug 2018 23:56:18 +0200

In both examples your stuff is encrypted an decrypted client side. The server sees only encrypted stuff as will do the police if they seize the server.

Yuki (雪亮) 🇵🇭 🌏

Sun, 19 Aug 2018 02:47:07 +0200

M. Dent

Sun, 19 Aug 2018 03:16:06 +0200

I've been thinking about this for a bit... I wonder if a better solution isn't to do something like the decentralized crypto wallet for BitShares does where a user has a public/private keypair they can have on their endpoint device.

I haven't figured out all the pieces needed with message exchange and key exchange yet - it involves wrapping keys in multiple layers of encryption. I remember reading an algorithm that makes it possible, but don't remember enough details at this point.

If an endpoint device gets compromised, the individual conversations accessible to that endpoint would be compromised. But it would deal with the problem.of compromised servers.

Raymond Monret

Sun, 19 Aug 2018 08:56:47 +0200

"Ring" uses a distributed hash table to store id <-> public key relationshipsin a meer to peer setting. In Hubzilla world one could probably use webfinger to do this with an "end to end" public key associated with the regular server-related public key if needed.

someone

Sun, 19 Aug 2018 09:07:30 +0200

thx for all your answers :)

All the keys needed to decrypt the contents of the database are stored inside the database itself,

- @Raymond Monret
wondering if this could be solved if hubzilla would not store the private key to decrypt the message, but a hash that when enterd the password creates the hash to read the message.

someone

Sun, 19 Aug 2018 09:13:01 +0200

I haven't tried post/comment encryption, this is very interesting!

- @Yuki
yes, it's great when the purpuse is to just hide some messages. Thought it's not very comfotable to use to encrypt entire conversations, sice you have to click and type passwords all the time.
Haven't used keypass by myself, but maybe it could solve that issue.

someone

Sun, 19 Aug 2018 09:15:15 +0200

"Then use cryFS for example locally. This should be save for your files."

this sounds promising.

Raymond Monret

Sun, 19 Aug 2018 09:58:19 +0200

From previous conversations with Mike, storing everything encrypted on the server AND doing the encryption/decryption on the server also was tried and led to very poor performance.
One could probably enhance the e2e module by having it remember within a session the last key used to decrypt a message sent to or received from a given set of contacts (using an html5 storage with a master key).

Mike Macgirvin

Sun, 19 Aug 2018 22:40:08 +0200

The performance issue was from encrypting data at the application level and there was no real increase in security as the application needed to have the keys also. Several people have run Hubzilla on encrypted file systems and that seems to work fine. There are a number of encryption and E2EE abilities in the project code that you're welcome to explore (*), but ultimately the project is a web publishing and social media system and making it perform as a darknet probably isn't the best technology fit.

(*) For instance there's code support for linking external E2EE mechanisms such as PGP/GPG and S/MIME. The JS E2EE is extensible to custom algorithms (as is the S2SE) so you can use things like OTP mechanisms which are basically uncrackable outside of quantum solutions. You can do all these things right now. I can't help you very much except to describe the possibilities in vague and general terms because otherwise it could result in criminal prosecution in my country.

What we've discovered is that such mechanisms are outside the scope of the project and may have disastrous side effects. For instance, E2EE is the perfect malware delivery service because by definition there is nothing between the sender and receiver which has the ability to detect and block it. Likewise if the cost of decryption is prohibitive, state actors will just resort to torture and violence if they perceive a threat. In my own dealings with state actors, keyloggers were installed on every device in my home and work. All the encryption in the world won't help you if the plaintext is leaking before it even reaches the encryptor. At some point the resources of the state far outweighs your own abilities and the value of the information you're trying to hide, and also the security of your "system" --- which includes all the human assets and technology combined (operating systems, routers, all your software). Start there. Secure your "system". You'll find that a one-stop privacy solution or relying on a single piece of software isn't even a consideration.

someone

Mon, 20 Aug 2018 10:04:06 +0200

thx mike. I understand that hubzilla does not intend to be or was designed to be some sort of "secure darknet".

What I (with the informations that are visable to me) don't understand is

What we've discovered is that such mechanisms are outside the scope of the project and may have disastrous side effects.

shure E2EE can be used for malware delivery. Thought just as any email service that offers PGP E. To avoid abuse of the service, one could enable E2EE only for somewhat trusted people. (similiar as many of the libre hoster that are focused on activism and such do)

Thought I wondering if there are other arguments that I do not yet see/understand.
(the violence force argument is valid, but also as valid to do the same unencrypted. (E2EE encryption is legal here) Stopping our activism as a response to state opression is not an option for us)

At some point the resources of the state far outweighs your own abilities and the value of the information you're trying to hide,

Yes. But that also means the state needs to ponder how much resources they can/want to aquire to maybe gain control over the information.

You'll find that a one-stop privacy solution or relying on a single piece of software isn't even a consideration.

Of course. To have secure as possible communication, everything involved needs to secure as possible.
Having it "secure enough" is what I'm looking for. (meaning one can't prevent any option that results in leaking, but to make it difficult enough so that the chances are great nothing get's leaked)

(sidenote: usecase is plain and simple activism in a place with relative high human rights standarts. Nothing special, nothing outstanding.)

Mike Macgirvin

Mon, 20 Aug 2018 11:43:47 +0200

I cannot discuss this subject with you. Not in public, not in private. Not at all. Read the code. Learn its history. We've explored a lot of different ways of accomplishing these kinds of use cases. Some still exist. Some were abandoned.

someone

Mon, 20 Aug 2018 12:06:46 +0200

ok. I can understand this.

someone

Mon, 20 Aug 2018 12:57:10 +0200

someone created a forum to collect and organize informations related to @hubzilla infosec

Marshall Sutherland

Mon, 20 Aug 2018 14:08:28 +0200

I can't help you very much except to describe the possibilities in vague and general terms because otherwise it could result in criminal prosecution in my country.

(Plus a possible 10 years in jail for not unlocking your phone)

I think I've been cured of any desire to move to the land down under.

someone

Mon, 20 Aug 2018 15:10:09 +0200

uff, didn't know laws that taff there.
It just sounds as if privacy is not seen as a right but as a crime :(

M. Dent

Mon, 20 Aug 2018 16:30:22 +0200

@someone - Just curious - is your original post related to the stuff going on in Bavaria?

someone

Mon, 20 Aug 2018 18:49:32 +0200

it's related to #bure, a small village in france that is basicly in a stage of emergency with 24/7 police/military patrol, caused by a project called #cigeo that is claimed to be an experiment to demp nuclear waste into the ground. (they didn't called it experiment from the beginning, but did so later then to minimize resistance against it.)
It aims to be the solution for the nuclear waste in france.

Many of those that opose this project are criminalized, incl. medics and legal support.

Brumaire

Mon, 20 Aug 2018 18:59:50 +0200

Ah, la répression est vraiment si intense la-haut ? :/ Aurais-tu des sources à ce sujet ?

Raymond Monret

Mon, 20 Aug 2018 19:54:11 +0200

Wouldn't you be better off using a VPS off site if you fear the police might set you up?

someone

Mon, 20 Aug 2018 20:46:54 +0200

@Raymond Monret
yes, propably.

someone

Mon, 20 Aug 2018 20:50:53 +0200

@Brumaire
thought if repression is intense or not is very subjective. For some it is intense, for others not.
Here's a pad that is listening some of the interactions with the cops.
https://semestriel.framapad.org/p/9xEITo18uT

Erik R

Mon, 20 Aug 2018 21:38:22 +0200

Using Veracrypt (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt) it is possible to encrypt a disk without header so that no one can ever prove that the disk is encrypted unless they have the key and can decrypt the disk. It might be possible using LUKS on Linux as well (LUKS without header).

There are some obstacles with this setup though, no record is kept about the cipher used or other parameters so you need to keep them somewhere for backup. Using the default will work for a while until the defaults are changed at some point.

Disk encryption is a safe protection if the server is turned off, but in general no protection if the server is running and the disk is decrypted and mounted.

Now this might not be a usable setup for Hubizilla but can be very handy in other scenarios. Let's say you have a USB-stick or USB-drive with a partition of old photos using 40% of the space and a spare, not yet formatted partition where the rest is allocated that in reality is formatted using veracrypt.

Raymond Monret

Mon, 20 Aug 2018 21:47:17 +0200

Sounds like truecrypt which alas got compromised.

Daniel

Mon, 20 Aug 2018 21:49:47 +0200

VeraCrypt has taken the TrueCrypt source and updates it.

Mike Macgirvin

Tue, 21 Aug 2018 13:43:17 +0200

(Plus a possible 10 years in jail for not unlocking your phone)

I think I've been cured of any desire to move to the land down under.

You should store nothing of any informational value on your American personal tracking device. If you do, you're an idiot. The Americans have every secret you've stored there. So do the Russians. So do the Chinese and the Israelis. So do Walmart and Burger King and Frankie's Pizza and Facebook. The Aussies are nothing if not polite. They'll ask you. They may threaten you with incarceration, but at least they ask.

M. Dent

Mon, 29 Oct 2018 00:01:55 +0100

Just when I though @Mike Macgirvin may have been being a bit hyperbolic here (largely I agree with the sentiment, but I wasn't sure I agreed with the details), I find this on Slashdot:

Nobody's Cellphone Is Really That Secure, Bruce Schneier Reminds - Slashdot

Earlier this week, The New York Times reported that the Russians and the Chinese were eavesdropping on President Donald Trump's personal cellphone and using the information gleaned to better influence his behavior. This should surprise no one, writes Bruce Schneier. From a story: Security experts ha...